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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to clarify the concepts of knowledge to develop a
better theoretical understanding based on one of the eldest semiotic insights
from one unfortunately often forgotten philosopher of modern semiotic:
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716). In his ‘Meditationes de Cogni-
tione, Veritate, et Ideis’ (1684), he develops a systematical, dichotomous
characterization of the di¤erent levels of knowledge acquisitions. According
to his view, knowledge is essentially symbolic: it takes place in a system of
representations which possesses language-like structures and which can be
characterized on speciﬁc hierarchic levels from ‘dark knowledge’ (‘notio ob-
scura’) up to ‘distinct knowledge’ (‘notio distincta’) to be distinguished by
the criteria of recognizing and communicating the single elements (‘nota-
rum notae’) constructing knowledge as a continuum.
From a semiotic point of view, the paper shows that the awareness of the
hierarchy of knowledge intensity can supply a framework for conceptual
analysis and modeling of knowledge creation processes. As a result, we
actually should focus, not only in knowledge management, on the communi-
cation processes when creating knowledge. Leibniz shows the fundamental
problem of decomposing knowledge in externalization processes, which is
only possible by the use of symbols, needing clear explanations through
symbols again. Therefore, organization should be concerned with the cre-
ation of shared representations and meaning systems with respect to di¤er-
ent levels of explicitly as Leibniz showed us.
Keywords: cognitio symbolica; cognition; knowledge management;
knowledge creation; knowledge communication; knowledge
hierarchy.
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In the new economy, conversations are the
most important form of work. Conversations
are the way knowledge workers discover
what they know, share it with their colleagues,
and in the process create new knowledge for
the organization
— Webber (1993: 28)
1. Introduction
For several years now, knowledge management seems to have promised a
concept by which the most valuable resource of an enterprise, the human
knowledge of its employees, can be captured and stored. The main focus
within di¤erent kinds of such concepts is put on information technologies
and documents stored therein (Pfe¤er and Sutton 1999). What has still
been missing until now in the debate on knowledge, information, and
their manageability is a fundamental reﬂection upon some basic ap-
proaches of what is meant by communication process at all, recognized as
the critical point in knowledge creation and transfer. Another reason for
this development might be seen in a lack of understanding of the nature
of knowledge and the underlying processes of knowledge externalization
and transfer via communication (More 1998; Nonaka 1998; von Krogh
et al. 2000).
However, according to di¤erent theoretical approaches, various models
exist that attempt to explain the complex phenomenon, e.g., system theory
approaches (Luhmann 1991), information theory approaches (Shannon
and Weaver 1949) or constructivism theory approaches (e.g., Maturana
and Varela 1992; Ste¤e and Thompson 2000). If we deﬁne communica-
tion in terms of intentional interaction by means of signs between at least
two individuals (cf. Ungeheuer 1990), i.e., the fundamental condition of
communication as a process of semiosis1 including the involvement of a
communicator, a sign, and a recipient or interpreter of the sign, one fruit-
ful approach might be the general theory of signs: Semiotics. Taking the
underlying di¤erentiation between the three entities of data, information,
and knowledge in knowledge management concepts seriously, we have to
rethink the common externalizable, positivistic, and technocratic view of
knowledge as being codiﬁed in artifacts, representing an accurate copy
of the knowledge in people’s mind. By taking a critical distance towards
taken-for-granted theories on knowledge and management imagined
as explicit, storable, and controllable, this approach tries to rethink the
concept of knowledge from an unaccustomed but inventive perspective:
the idea of knowledge represented and constructed by signs according to
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Leibniz’s theory of knowledge. Some aspects of this view are indicated in
modern knowledge management concepts when Nonaka and Takeuchi
(1995) deﬁne knowledge as symbolic representations of objects and links
between objects, but without specifying further consequences.
This semiotic approach from one of the founding fathers of modern se-
miotic concepts created in 1684 could provide a framework for modern
conceptual analysis of information and knowledge by pointing out the
relation to communication. In this way, knowledge is not regarded as an
entity, but as a semiotic construct.
In fact, while we can apply the archaic meaning of ‘information’ as
‘formation,’ derived from the Latin word ‘forma’ and the Greek word
‘morphe,’ information (in contradiction to knowledge) could be just
transmission of ‘forms’ without ‘contents.’ Knowledge cannot be mere
form, but there has to be some form or shape linked with some semantic
content: a form stands for something else. The token standing for some-
thing else is normally called a sign. This way knowledge could be consid-
ered as a semiotic sign. One of the founding fathers and seminal thinkers
of semiotics, Charles S. Peirce, deﬁned a sign as
. . . something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capac-
ity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equiva-
lent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the
interpretant of the ﬁrst sign. The sign stands for something, its object. (CP: 2.228)
In essence we create our knowledge by creating signs as we interact with
objects in our environment. Thus there must be a subject who is able
to interpret something to represent something else. Therefore, knowledge
also needs an understanding subject with interpretative abilities, trans-
forming mental activities of representations. In other words, knowing is a
fundamentally human act (McDermott 1999) which is mediated through
signs. It can never be isomorphoric with the objects of the world.
In Leibniz’s terms, the mental activity can be described as ‘cognition.’
In our terminology, we would refer to the process leading to ‘knowledge
acquisition.’ As we will see, Leibniz’s theory of knowledge applies the
principle of continuity to the theory of perception, reﬂecting a hierarchy
of knowledge intensity. As a result, he di¤erentiates between least perfect
perceptions of whose occurrence we are not conscious, to the most perfect
perceptions that are endowed with reﬂective power and acts of reﬂection
on all of the objects which constitute the perception.
The awareness of the hierarchy of knowledge intensity can supply a
framework for conceptual analysis and modeling of knowledge manage-
ment processes. If we refer to knowledge as a process of semiosis, and
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semiosis as an ongoing process of cognition and interpretation of signs,
we have to take into consideration the limitations of knowledge explica-
tions and externalizations. In the process of knowledge communication
we interact with each other by use of symbols. According to Leibniz, the
meanings of these used symbols often remain implicit and ‘dark’ because
of one fundamental problem: symbols can only be explicated by other
symbols. While communicating, we often assume others’ understanding
of our signs and proceed until a misunderstanding becomes obvious.
One of the reasons for communication failure therefore can be seen in
the missing or belated explication of meanings, the missing embedding
into another’s context. The same problem occurs when knowledge is
to be transferred or stored into databases. Often what is left are data
without context, which are di‰cult or even impossible to understand and
use.
As a result, in knowledge management we actually should focus on the
communication processes between people rather than on knowledge or
even storage technologies directly. It is important to note that the knowl-
edge management organization should be concerned with what Jakobson
(1960) refers to as shared meaning systems with respect to di¤erent levels
of explicity as Leibniz showed us. At the most obvious level, this refers to
a common language or deﬁnitions of terms that must be shared by the
communicators (Meredith and Burstein 2000).
Therefore, this paper will give some insights into the current state of
the art in knowledge communication issues. First, I will show that it
might be fruitful to connect communication issues with knowledge man-
agement approaches in general. In the following section, I will present one
example: I will give a short reﬂection of Leibniz’s theory of knowledge
and his connection to communication and signs as an explanation in the
ﬁeld of semiotics. Since this paper can only give a ﬁrst insight into a semi-
otic approach, Leibniz’s theory is chosen among the vast ﬁeld of semiotic
theories to serve as the classical example of how the sign can be consid-
ered as a knowledge representation. As we will see in the last section, these
insights may contribute to a semiotic understanding of knowledge trans-
fer and creation processes. By doing so, it may form a basis for further
developments of theoretical assumptions and practical insights.
2. First insights into the state of the art in knowledge
communication issues
Until now there has been little in the literature explicitly linking com-
munication to knowledge management (More 1998; Etzioni and Etzioni
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1999; Von Krogh et al. 2000; Wilkesmann 2000), although the topic
seems to have the potential of becoming a signiﬁcant issue in the knowl-
edge management debate in particular and in communications manage-
ment in general. Communication plays an important role in the e‰cient
and e¤ective transfer of experiences, insights, and know-how. It serves as
a prerequisite for coordinated, organizational action and decision making
(Straub and Karahanna 1998), but above all for the co-construction of
knowledge.
One of the main challenges of knowledge management will be the
transfer of knowledge to stakeholders like customers and employees via
communication. An example for this development is illustrated by Schmid
(2001). He demonstrated that for the customer perspective, it follows that
the design of a product cannot be realized successfully only by a manage-
ment of production in terms of engineering (‘Implementation I’) any
more.
The concept and design of the product also has to be transferred into
the awareness of the client, i.e., the knowledge about the product has to
be created together with the customers’ mental activities by communica-
tion (‘Implementation II’). The time lapse from a product idea until its
realization and availability on the market has been shortened tremen-
dously whereas in the meantime the communication of product design to
the client basically remained the same. In terms of semiotic, as ever be-
fore, the customer has to get to know all dimensions of the product serv-
ing as a sign, i.e., on the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic levels.2 This
‘diverse development of inter-time development of implementation I and
II lead to a shift of their importance away from the implementation on
the production side towards the implementation on the communication
side’ (Schmid 2001: 48).
Figure 1. The shift of importance from production to communications (Schmid 2001: 48)
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This shift may lead to a turning point, putting the human factor of the
intellectual capital in the center. It became obvious, especially in knowl-
edge management, that focusing on IT-implementation by itself will not
be a feasible solution for further developments with regard to the creation
and distribution of knowledge in processes of communication (cf. Von
Krogh et al. 2000: 12). With respect to the complexity of communication
processes and culture, the IT-solution serves as a necessary foundation
that makes the upper levels possible. Implementing a platform for a vir-
tual community, for example, may serve as a medium for virtual commu-
nication of this community and give it an infrastructure, but the manage-
ment of the community encompasses much more. To enhance intensive
communication and promote the knowledge transfer, a community man-
ager has to ensure a shared aim and establish a language within the
community. The second level therefore has to refer to the communication
processes and structures and aim at a so-called ‘conversation manage-
ment’ (cf. Von Krogh et al. 2000: 121). Only by facilitating relationships
and conversations can local knowledge be generated and shared across
the organization. At a deeper level, this view ‘relies on a new sense of
emotional knowledge and care in the organization’ (Von Krogh et al.
2000: 4) which builds up a communication culture including values and
norms.
In all, Von Krogh et al. (2000: 4) stress the limitation of knowledge
management itself in terms of overemphasizing information technology
and measurement tools in the past.3 As a consequence, they propose the
concept of ‘knowledge enabling’:
Knowledge enabling includes facilitating relationships and conversations as well
as sharing local knowledge across an organization or beyond geographic and cul-
tural borders. At a deeper level, however, it relies on a new sense of emotional
knowledge and care in the organization, one that highlights how people treat
each other and encourages creativity — even playfulness. (Von Krogh et al.
2000: 4)
Pointing out ﬁve enabling factors — knowledge vision, conversation
management, mobilization of knowledge activists, context creation, and
globalization of local knowledge — they suggest physical, face-to-face ex-
periences as the key to conversion and transfer of tacit knowledge (cf. also
Nonaka 1998: 46). As Nonaka puts it, ‘through dialogue, an individual’s
mental models and skills are converted into common terms and concepts’
(Nonaka 1998: 47). But is this conversion of mental models actually as
easy as it appears? If language is one medium for the expression of one’s
observation about the world, and one’s observations are required to
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create new knowledge (Von Krogh et al. 2000: 138), a company’s lan-
guage represents one of its most important assets (cf. Fiol 1991). If we re-
fer to an organization as a system of a speciﬁc kind of interactive behav-
ior, as a complex multifactorial system, the company’s language and
knowledge is a result of an ongoing process of semiosis of the individual
actors (e.g., the employees). Therefore, an organization can be seen as se-
miotic constructs created and used by actors in continuous learning pro-
cesses in interaction with their social and physical environment.
More points out the linkage from communication and organizational
learning to knowledge management and argues that corresponding
to the di¤erent levels of organizational learning from individual up to
organizational level, it is necessary to deal ‘. . . with the di¤erent com-
munication processes and practices incorporated in these varied levels’
(More 1998: 355–356). In discussing some categories of knowledge and
organizations, she states that the critical aspect in these ﬁelds can mainly
be traced back to the communication of knowledge ‘. . . in terms of inter-
personal and collective organization practices . . . meaning creation
through dialogue and non-verbal cultural dimensions’ (More 1998: 356).
Therefore, it will be important to consider the pivotal point of ‘communi-
cation as discourse or conversation’ (More 1998: 357), i.e., emphasizing
the relational dimensions among people and highlighting organizational
understanding and knowledge as being produced and reproduced through
discourse.
But with respect to the problem of knowledge sharing, knowledge
transfer and even creation, one may notice that communication cannot
be understood in terms of simple transferring knowledge in container
metaphors in such a way that one only has to put his or her knowledge
into it and send it to a receiver who has to unwrap it. Many communica-
tion models decorated with various metaphors can actually be attrributed
to the classic sender-receiver model of Shannon and Weaver (1949). What
is often forgotten is that their linear model only describes the technical
process of transferring messages in general without reﬂections on the con-
tent or the e¤ects of the messages, leaving out explanations about the
complex phenomenon of communication.
According to More, what is missing from the current ﬂurry is ‘. . . the
vocabulary of communication . . . in the ﬁeld of knowledge management’
(More 1998: 358) which may provide ‘. . . a richer grasp of intellectual
capital and of knowledge management per se in contemporary and future
organizational life’ (More 1998: 359). But like Deetz (1997: 119) she
only points out the importance without further substantial develop-
ments, e.g., how such a vocabulary might look or by giving any other
solutions.
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Emanating from the outlined importance of conversation and language
as one medium in particular as an essential component of knowledge cre-
ation it is worthwhile to take a look at some fundamentals that can be
derived from communication theory. In the following section, as a start-
ing point, I will propose to have a look at how knowledge can be charac-
terized in semiotic terms describing it as signs. What are the characteris-
tics of a sign that has the ability of transferring knowledge? Which levels
of knowledge can be distinguished from the semiotic point of view? This
micro perspective might give some basic insights which may inﬂuence fur-
ther statements on macro perspectives.
3. The implication of Leibniz’s ‘cognitio symbolica’ theory
Usually when we investigate knowledge management issues in an organi-
zation, we actually take a look at artifacts such as an Intranet or lessons
learned databases, and behaviors such as team conversations or expert
communication in order to create or ‘exchange’ knowledge. But neither
the artifacts nor the behavior can represent the ‘knowledge management
system’ itself. What is needed is a relation between artifacts and behavior
to describe a more or less whole ‘knowledge management system’ of an
organization. Such a relation is a representation, shared by a number of
interacting actors.4 This representation gives both the artifacts and the
behavior a meaning. A representation is therefore the result of the
mental activity of an actor. In Leibniz’s terms this mental activity can
be described as ‘cognition.’ This term describes the process that leads
to ‘knowledge acquisition.’ Because our knowledge of reality is necessar-
ily a representational construction, the representational activity can be
studied from a semiotic perspective, focusing on the meaning of behavior,
i.e., the semiotic dimension of organizational behavior. The semiotic be-
havior is a sign-creating and sign-using one, always presupposing a ‘some-
thing’ that is represented through the sign. What is represented is what we
can call the ‘object,’ which can be the world, an experience, or even an
interaction. In the representational or semiotic process an object is related
to a meaning through the sign. Signs can be viewed in di¤erent ways in
semiotic theory:
According to Charles Morris (1971 [1938]), signs may describe the be-
haviorist view when seen as stimuli that generate speciﬁc responses. Sec-
ondly, understood as adaptive behavior from a biological-anthropological
perspective, signs may also play an important role in the interaction
of organisms with their environment (cf. Uexku¨ll [1982]; Cassirer
[1969]). A third perspective is the phenomenological one, where signs
446 D. Ingenho¤
are regarded as being the building blocks of consciousness (cf. Husserl
[1922]; Merleau-Ponty [1964]). A fourth approach might be the study
of signs as cultural conventions. Here, language becomes the prototypical
sign system. Signs convey messages and are used to share experiences
within a community. Theoretical basis for this perspective can be found
in Karl Bu¨hler (1982 [1934]), Umberto Eco (1987) or Louis Hjelmslev
(1961). Finally, signs may be viewed as cognition or knowledge. From
this perspective of logic and epistemology, signs refer to a world, real
and imagined, present and absent, concrete and abstract. Leibniz is a
founding father of this approach. Although his theory, being written in
Latin, su¤ers from di‰culties impeding its reception, it is worth taking a
look on it.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) was inﬂuenced by papers of
Cavalieris, Descartes, Locke, Pascal and by meetings with Arnauld, Ma-
lebranche, Nicole and others. He can be placed between Descartes’ ratio-
nalism (locating the beginning of cognition in mind) and Locke’s empiri-
cism (locating the matter in pure sensitive experience) whose tabula rasa
formula ‘nihil est in intellectu, quod non ante fuerit in sensu’ (nothing is in
mind which was not in sensual perception before) was added to by ‘nisi
ipse intellectus’ (nothing except mind itself ).
Leibniz is of value to gain insight into the process of knowledge acqui-
sition from a semiotic point of view. In his ‘Meditationes de Cognitione,
Veritate, et Ideis’ (Reﬂections on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas), which
clariﬁes his theory of knowledge, he tries to give a systematical character-
ization of the di¤erent kinds and levels of knowledge acquisition and its
prerequisites. By starting with the genus ‘cognitio,’5 which can be trans-
lated as ‘knowledge’ he describes the several species by means of a dicho-
tomous classiﬁcation reﬂecting the particular rank of perfection of knowl-
edge. Judging from Leibniz’s original plans for a universal language,
Leibniz had a speciﬁc view about the nature of human cognitive pro-
cesses, particularly about the nature of human reasoning. According to
his view, knowledge is essentially symbolic: it takes place in a system of
representations that possesses language-like structures. Indeed, Leibniz
was one of the ﬁrst to point out that all humans use certain signs in the
knowledge acquisition process. Without signs it wouldn’t be possible to
even think of anything distinctly or reason about it.
To understand Leibniz’s theory, one might start with reviewing the dif-
ference between ‘res repraesentans’ and ‘res repraesentata.’ In Leibniz’s
terms, ‘res repraesentans’ refers to a mental representation of a so-called
‘oblatum.’6 By ‘oblatum,’ Leibniz suggests an entity or a self-produced
idea of the knowledge-acquiring subject which therefore belongs to the
sphere of ‘notio’ (knowledge).
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The objects to be acquired in the process of knowledge acquisition
are called ‘res repraesentata,’ which therefore are outside the sphere of
‘notio’ but belonging to the sphere of world (‘mundus’). In an ideal
case, a ‘notio’ is composed of several known and distinguishable ele-
ments called ‘notae’ which themselves can be subdivided into ‘notarum
notae.’
Leibniz starts with a description of certain levels of knowledge to
be distinguished by the criteria of recognizing the elements of the ‘res
repraesentata.’
The lowermost level of knowledge is called ‘notio obscura.’ On this
level of least perfect perception, one cannot recognize the ‘res repraesen-
Figure 2. Overview of central terms belonging to ‘mens’ (mind) and ‘mundus’ (world)
Figure 3. Leibniz’s hierarchy of cognition/knowledge levels
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tata.’ No identiﬁcation or di¤erentiation can be made from other ‘res re-
praesentata.’ Only the existing ‘oblatum’ in our ‘mens’ as a ‘res repraesen-
tans’ is present and releases the process of knowledge acquisition (‘non
agnoscere’) ‘Obscura est notio quae non su‰cit ad rem repraesentatam ag-
noscendam . . .’ (Leibniz 1965 [1684]: 422). But though addressing the ob-
ject to be recognized, the process remains in searching for criteria to dif-
ferentiate. For this level, Leibniz mentions the cognition of a once-seen
ﬂower or an animal that is only vaguely or obscurely recognized. We can-
not identify or perceive these objects correctly; our perception of them is
quite cloudy. Usually, we are not even conscious of the occurrence of the
objects.
At the level of the ‘cognitio clara,’ the ‘res repraesentata’ are ascertain-
able (‘agnoscere’) and can be identiﬁed from others. At this level, Leibniz
makes a distinction between a ‘cognitio confusa’ and a ‘notio distincta’ by
using the criteria of communicability of the ‘notae’ (Leibniz 1965 [1684]:
422).
A ‘cognitio confusa’ cannot distinguish between the necessary ‘notae’ of
the ‘res repraesentata’ by which it deﬁnes itself. The identiﬁcation of the
‘res repraesentata’ is only possible by simple sensory perception but can-
not be communicated explicitly or discriminated analytically. For this
category, Leibniz gives the example of having a certain kind of knowl-
edge on perfumes or colors: ‘ita colores, odores, sapores, aliaque peculiaria
sensuum objecta satis clare quidem agnoscimus et a se invicem discernimus,
sed simplici sensuum testimonio, non vero notis enuntiabilibus . . .’ (Leibniz
1965 [1684]: 422). To recognize them depends mainly on sensory presen-
tation in direct perceptions or in remembrance. For transferring this kind
of knowledge, it would be necessary to share the same presence of a con-
text. An important precondition is that the actor has to be copresent in
the concrete situation, as no name yet exists; no transfer via signs is pos-
sible. We will come back to this kind of knowledge when drawing paral-
lels to what today is called ‘tacit knowledge’ (Polanyi 1966).
At the next step, a ‘notio distincta’ can identify the ‘notae’ of the ‘res
repraesentata’ as well as communicate them (‘discerne’). But the act of
communication of the ‘notae’ is not an essential precondition of a ‘notio
distincta’ which therefore can also only be carried out mentally. The ‘no-
tio distincta’ encompasses ﬁve further levels, one to be characterized as a
special case (Leibniz 1965 [1684]: 423).
To start with this special case, the simplest cognition is called ‘notio
primitiva,’ which can be characterized by three points: ‘nota sui ipsius,’
‘irresolubilis,’ and ‘per se intelligere.’ This deﬁnition encompasses three
features. First, the ‘notio primitiva’ does not consist of any further ‘notae’
and therefore is the nota itself (‘nota sui ipsius’). Second, from this it
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follows that this nota cannot be subdivided (or ‘dissolved’) in any further
‘notae’ because it is not composed of other ‘notae’ (‘irresolubilis’). Third,
if the nota itself is the only characteristic; it can only be understood
through this one and only nota itself (‘per se intelligere’). With this special
case Leibniz points out the theoretical possibility of knowledge which is
not composed of various characteristic elements (notae) but represents it-
self ‘through itself.’ Leibniz himself points out that he can scarcely imag-
ine an example of such a kind of ‘notio primitiva,’ but for the complete-
ness of the dimensions it is important to integrate this case. At the level of
the ‘cognitio inadaequata,’ the ‘notae’ of the ‘notae’ (the so-called ‘nota-
rum notae’) cannot be recognized precisely. Here, one can only precisely
recognize of which elements the knowledge is composed, but the elements
themselves cannot be subdivided into their ‘notarum notae’ and therefore
cannot be explained in further detail. Leibniz called this kind of knowl-
edge ‘inappropriate.’
If this distinction and identiﬁcation of the ‘notarum notae’ is possible,
nothing confusing is left and the ideal case of a ‘‘cognitio adaequata’’ is
reached. For this most perfect perception, endowed with reﬂexive power
and acts of reﬂections, all knowledge elements including the distinction
and explanation of the elements are possible (‘seu cum analysis ad ﬁnem us-
que producta habetur, cognition est adaequata’) (Leibniz 1965 [1684]: 423).
One further step beyond this ideal case is called ‘cognitio intuitiva,’
which is characterized by a realization of all ‘notae’ not only distinct, but
at the same time. For this case, only a ‘notio primitiva’ can serve as a
‘cognitio intuitiva.’ In all of the other cases, a realization of all ‘notae’
and ‘notarum notae’ of a complex cognition of knowledge cannot be
made at the same time but only in a process in time.
In this knowledge cognition process, Leibniz points out the simple
statement that we use signs instead of the objects. While doing so, we do
not explain each sign with its elements explicitly because we think that
this explanation is not necessary. Proceeding on the assumption that the
explication would be possible if necessary, we operate with mental entities
in our minds. The exact explications and meanings of these mental enti-
ties often remain dark in our mind. This level of cognition is called ‘cogi-
tatio symbolica’ or, as a synonym, ‘cogitatio caeca’ (‘qualem cogitationem
caecam vel etiam symbolicam appellare soleo, qua et in Algebra et in Arith-
metica utimur, imo fere ubique’) (Leibniz 1965 [1684]: 423). Leibniz refers
to the term ‘blind’ (‘caeca’) because an explicit explication of the words
used as signs would lead to an inﬁnite recourse, which would mean that
the explicated signs itself would have to be explicated, too. Therefore,
one disclaims an explication of each ‘notae’ and supposes that the words
are understood at least approximately. Herein one reason can be seen
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why, above all in the so-called ‘symbolic cognition,’ contradictions often
remain undiscovered. Therefore, the level of ‘cogitatio symbolica’ can be
characterized, in the Leibnitzian sense as a clear, distinct, and inadaequate
cognition (see ﬁgure 2). The knowledge as described here represents a self-
referential system that is open to the world only through processes of
communication, explication and thereby continuous constructing and
restructuring.
Summing up, we can ﬁnd a precise distinction of knowledge-levels in
Leibniz’s hierarchy of cognition. Starting from the perspective of knowl-
edge as a process of semiosis, which we found as an ongoing process of
cognition and interpretation of signs, we can easily become aware of
the limitations of knowledge explications through communication. This
is because all elements of knowledge have to be explained through com-
munication, i.e., through communicating sings as well, in order to reach
understanding.
This perspective is highly interesting because it draws our attention to a
basic human experience: the experience that the reality we live in is al-
ways a mediated or semiotic reality with the sign as the starting point for
our explorations. From this approach we assume that signs necessarily
mediate between data and knowledge. Data is not directly accessible or
known directly, but has to be translated into information by use of signs.
Therefore, the relevance of taking a closer look at signs becomes quite ob-
vious, for the processes of communication within an organization as well
as for external communication with customers and other stakeholders.
The pivotal point in knowledge transfer to employees and customers will
be the e¤ective inﬂuence of the ‘actors’ by use of signs, i.e., giving them
the right ‘hints’ to create understanding. If symbols form the basis of un-
derstanding, it is these representations that form the basis for all situation
assessment and decision-making. From this point, it will be of great im-
portance to establish a well-deﬁned set of formal rules for syntax, seman-
tics, and pragmatics. These present set of symbols will then be used as a
basis for developing shared representations, building the foundation for
any future shared virtual environments, as we also can learn from Jakob-
son (1960) or Gumperz (1982) with their references to shared meaning
systems or codes. Gumperz shows that there exists a general mechanism
consisting of a bunch of communicative and interpretative or ‘inferential’
codes that are not to be understood as a ﬁxed set of signs, but as contrast-
ing ways to contextually organize the cognitive complexity into diverse
sets of communicative signals. These codes are inherently interpretative
and loose. They precede language, emerging from semantic representa-
tions including referential and prepositional contents like shared knowl-
edge, dispositions, etc. In this sense, a code is an abstract formulation
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and construction about the relationship between an observable sign and
the interpretation of a sign.
One point of attachment concerning the knowledge creation processes
of employees, customers or other stakeholder groups might be the cre-
ation of a distinct language of the organization, explaining as many con-
stituting elements as possible and o¤ering opportunities to create codes to
better understand them. Furthermore, the central issue in knowledge ac-
quisition will be how to detect di¤erent forms of knowledge to foster inno-
vation and how to deal with them, e.g., tacit knowledge which depends
on sensory perception only and therefore requires the use of senses (cf.
‘cognitio confusa’). This process could be supported with what Gumperz
(1982) called ‘contextualization cues’ like paralinguistics, prosodics, kine-
sics or nonverbal elements through each actor in the particular concrete
situation. However, as shown as a starting point above, Leibniz’s theory
of knowledge can contribute deep insights to the knowledge management
debate, pointing out its chances and limitations.
4. Outlook: The relevance of Leibniz’s theory for communication
and knowledge
Although Leibniz’s theory of ‘cogitatio symbolica’ does not refer to in-
teraction processes between individuals explicitly, his systematic is of high
relevance for the process of human communication and can be trans-
ferred to the knowledge acquisition process. He speciﬁcally describes a
basic principle of how individuals interact with each other by use of sym-
bols and how this act of explanation can lead to misunderstandings. The
meaning of the used symbols always remains implicit and ‘dark’ in the
sense that the level of symbols cannot be transcended and has no access
to the ‘res’ itself. Even a paraphrase of the understood information as a
control means of understanding would itself again have to refer to sym-
bols. These symbols again would have to be explicated and so on, leading
to the same problem of veriﬁcation like at the beginning.
While communicating our knowledge we often suppose our partner’s
understanding of our signs and proceed until the moment when a misun-
derstanding becomes obvious. One of the reasons for communication fail-
ure in interpersonal communication of knowledge transfer therefore can
be seen in the missing or belated explication of the entities and meaning
to which we refer. As we have seen, only on the last level of ‘cognitio
adaequata’ are we actually able to explicate our knowledge precisely and
decompose the elements of which it consists. Paradoxically, this phenom-
enon can scarcely be overcome. Concerning the paradox of increasing
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explicity, it is the strong will of explicating knowledge that leads to the
ine‰ciency of its explication.
Moreover, within Leibniz’s theory we can ﬁnd an exact hierarchy of
the various levels of knowledge and how human cognitive processes
follow determinable axioms of logic to gain knowledge. Three centuries
later, we can ﬁnd similar ideas of distinguishing what today’s popular
theories call ‘tacit’ and ‘explicit’ knowledge. While tacit knowledge is dif-
ﬁcult to capture, codify, adopt, and distribute because individuals cannot
articulate this type of knowledge, explicit knowledge seems easy to artic-
ulate, to capture, and to distribute in di¤erent formats (Polanyi 1966).
Tacit knowledge can be compared to what Leibniz analyzed as dark or
confused knowledge. It can be described as a state of a¤airs, which is sim-
ilar to a remembered state of a¤airs and therefore always depends on the
context. Often, it cannot be coded, but has to be experienced. Sharing this
kind of knowledge is only possible for those who are copresent. Accord-
ing to Polanyi (1966: 16), in each activity there are two mutually exclu-
sive, di¤erent levels or dimensions of knowledge: Knowledge about the
object or phenomenon that is in focus — ‘focal knowledge,’ which can
be compared to artifacts. The knowledge that is used as a tool to handle
or improve what is in focus is called tacit knowledge and can also be
compared to the behavioral side. According to Polanyi, the focal and
tacit dimensions are complementary. The tacit knowledge functions as a
background knowledge that assists in accomplishing a task that is in fo-
cus. Both dimensions are important in the process of knowledge creation.
In a semiotic process, an object is related to a meaning with the help of
signs. As long as our perception of the world is unproblematic, we tend
to assume that our representations match the world. It is sometimes di‰-
cult to become aware, above all in homogenous teams, of the underlying
presumptions of a common sense world in which all members obviously
share a similar cognitive style. Finally, these presumptions can lead to a
lack of explanations for the single elements of knowledge in the knowl-
edge creation and transfer process. However, when the representation be-
comes ambiguous, because more than one representation is possible, and
di¤erent representations seem to contradict each other, then represen-
tation and reality part ways, and new representations have to be con-
structed. To support the process of knowledge creation, it might be
important to enable knowledge communication processes within an inter-
disciplinary team. Here, the chance of di¤erent cognitive styles leading
to di¤erent representation mechanisms may be higher than in homoge-
nous teams. In externalization processes, the ambiguity might be resolved
by decomposing knowledge into its elements as far as possible, always re-
ﬂecting the di‰culties in doing so.
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To conclude, if one acknowledges that knowledge consists of represen-
tations, and these representations are of unique importance in decision
systems within organizations, it becomes obvious that the management
of an organization basically consists of knowledge management. For the
management therefore it might be of great importance to gain a basic no-
tion of the epistemological perspectives on the various levels of how to
‘manage representations.’ The theory provides us with insights into how
to deal with di¤erent forms and levels of knowledge, as for example tacit
or ‘confused’ knowledge has to be experienced, while ‘distinct’ knowledge
can be analyzed into further details and communicated upon. Also, when
referring to the constantly growing environmental complexity we might
become aware of the challenge of growing interpretations of representa-
tions organizations are facing. Realizing these challenges, developing new
concepts and combining old concepts of managing them will be an impor-
tant step in the right direction. This paper has given a ﬁrst insight in it.
Notes
1. By ‘semiosis’ I mean . . . an action, or inﬂuence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of
three subjects, such as the sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative inﬂuence
not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs’’ (EP 2 1998: 441). In other
words, Peirce refers to an ongoing, dynamic and inﬁnite process of interpreting signs by
referring to other signs (Moore 1972).
2. The di¤erentiation between syntax, semantic, and pragmatic as the three dimensions of
semiotic can be traced back to Morris (1971 [1938]). He deﬁnes syntax as the relation of
signs among each other to form rules of combination, semantic as the relation of signs
and their ‘designats’ (objects) and pragmatic as the relation between signs and their ‘in-
terprets’ (‘living organisms’).
3. However, a turning point in knowledge management debates can be derived from the
recently growing theories doubting or even denying the possibility of actually managing
knowledge (Baecker [1999]; von Krogh et al. [2000]; Martensson [2000]; Maula [2000]).
4. Of course this does not imply that all actors involved must represent a knowledge man-
agement system in the same way or in one way only. But, if the knowledge management
system should be e¤ective, the involving actors should at least share a representation of
their behavior.
5. ‘Cognitio,’ ‘Cogitatio,’ and ‘Notio’ are synonyms in Leibniz’s theory (cf. Ungeheuer
1990: 502).
6. One translation for ‘oblatum’ could be ‘idea’ or ‘imagination.’
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